Transcendental Realism

Apr 8, 2025

Transcendental Realism defines truth as “a virtuous transcendence of perception toward actuality.” Confronting AI biases, aligning with ethical virtues, and transcending to actuality, offering a life line to the digital age.

Preprint 2025 © Peter Cuijpers – Conscio Press

A Virtuous Paradigm for Truth in the Digital Age

This article introduces Transcendental Realism, a paradigm redefining truth as “the virtuous transcendence of perception toward actuality.” Emerging from a critique of perception’s limits, it posits truth as a deductive process—confronting illusions with evidence, aligning outcomes with virtues (fidelity, humility), and transcending to a relational actuality—formalized as T = {P ∧ ¬E → B; B → V(F, H); V → A}. Rooted in philosophical traditions (Plato, c. 375 BCE; Kant, 1790) and responsive to 2025’s digital crisis (Rodrigues et al., 2016), it contrasts static theories (Aristotle, c. 350 BCE; Tarski, 1935) and pluralist accounts (Lynch, 2001). Transcendental Realism bridges classical epistemology to 2025’s technological and existential challenges, sparking a chase for truth beyond static definitions.

Keywords: Transcendental Realism, truth, perception, virtues, actuality, AI ethics, digital age.

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1. Introduction

The concept of truth has traversed a long arc in Western philosophy—from Plato’s ascent beyond the cave’s shadows (c. 375 BCE) to Aristotle’s assertion of correspondence between statement and reality (c. 350 BCE), Kant’s mind-shaped categories (1790), and Lynch’s functional pluralism (2001). Yet, in 2025, truth confronts an unprecedented crisis: digital distortions amplified by algorithmic bias, a pervasive erosion of trust in technological systems, and an existential fragility in the face of political and informational chaos (Arendt, 1967). Traditional frameworks—Aristotle’s static alignment, Tarski’s semantic precision (1935), Foucault’s power-driven discourse (1972)—prove inadequate for this digital age, where perception is muddied by data and power rather than clarified by reason or evidence.

In response, I propose Transcendental Realism, a paradigm that redefines truth as “the virtuous transcendence of perception toward actuality”—a process-oriented approach distinct from static properties or subjective constructs. Drawing from a philosophical reflection in (Cuijpers, 2025), this paradigm confronts perception’s illusions with an empirical test (e.g., a tree misidentified as a cake is met with reality’s contradiction), aligns the outcome with virtues such as fidelity and humility, and transcends toward a relational actuality—a living web beyond mere data or power.

This is not a loose metaphor but a deductive method, formalized as a three-step process: confrontation, alignment, and transcendence, expressed propositionally as T = {P ∧ ¬E → B; B → V(F, H); V → A}, where perception meets evidence, virtues guide, and actuality emerges.

Transcendental Realism serves a dual purpose. Philosophically, it reframes truth as a lived engagement rather than a fixed object, offering a synthesis of empirical, ethical, and ontological dimensions suited to epistemology’s perennial questions. Practically, it addresses 2025’s technological landscape, proposing an ethical-epistemological shift for artificial intelligence (AI) development—e.g., confronting AIs outputs with reality, aligning them with virtues per Floridi’s ethical framework (2013), and aiming for a blockchain-verified actuality.

This article articulates and defends this paradigm across seven sections. Section 2 traces its historical and theoretical roots, situating it among classical, modern, and contemporary accounts. Section 3 delineates its core premises and axiom, arguing its distinctiveness. Section 4 formalizes its methodology with logical precision for scholarly scrutiny. Section 5 explores its implications. Section 6 evaluates critiques and offers responses, while Section 7 concludes with its significance and future directions.

In an era where truth is both sought and obscured, Transcendental Realism provides a deductive framework to navigate the digital fray, bridging philosophy and technology with a process both rigorous and relevant.

2. Historical and Theoretical Background

The evolution of truth in Western philosophy provides the intellectual backdrop for Transcendental Realism, revealing a trajectory of definitions and challenges that culminate in 2025’s digital exigencies. In antiquity, Laozi (c. 500 BCE) framed truth as the Dao—an ineffable flow beyond naming—while Plato (c. 375 BCE) cast it as a transcendent Form, accessible only by ascending from the cave’s shadows to the sunlit real (Chan, 1963; Annas, 1981).

Aristotle (c. 350 BCE) grounded it in correspondence—“to say of what is that it is”—offering a pragmatic anchor later refined by Szaif (2018) Aquinas (c. 1259) synthesized this with theology, defining truth as the intellect’s alignment with reality under divine illumination, a medieval bridge between empirical and transcendent. These classical views—transcendent ascent, linguistic fit, divine unity—set foundational tensions.

The modern era disrupted these with epistemological shifts. Bacon (1620) introduced empirical testing in Novum Organum, insisting truth emerges from nature’s interrogation, a method foundational to science (Klein, 2012). Kant (1790) reframed truth as mind-dependent in Critique of Judgment, with perception shaped by a priori categories, leaving the noumenal unknowable—a subjective turn. Nietzsche (1911) radicalized this in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, declaring truth a fiction of power—“a mobile army of metaphors”—unmoored from reality. Dewey (1938) countered with a process-oriented pragmatism in Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, where truth emerges through active inquiry, not static correspondence. These shifts—empirical, subjective, perspectival, procedural—highlight perception’s growing role.

The 20th century refined these threads. Tarski (1935) formalized truth semantically—“‘snow is white’ is true if snow is white”—a linguistic precision sidestepping perception’s messiness. Wittgenstein shifted to language games in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, tying truth to contextual use (Wittgenstein, 1922).

Heidegger (1958) reimagined it as aletheia—unveiling Being—in Being and Time, a poetic transcendence. Bhaskar (1975) introduced critical realism in A Realist Theory of Science, positing stratified realities beyond perception, accessible through causal analysis (Bhaskar, 1975). Lynch (2001) embraced pluralism in Truth as One and Many, arguing truth varies by domain. Floridi (2013) framed truth as informational integrity in The Ethics of Information, vital for digital ethics. These—logical, contextual, existential, realist, pluralist, ethical—enrich but fragment the discourse.

In 2025, truth faces a digital crisis. Rodrigues et al. (2016) reveal big data’s distortions—curated shadows skewing reality—while Marian David (2015) documents trust’s erosion amid digital chaos . Arendt (1967) warns of truth’s political fragility in ‘Truth & Politics’, a concern amplified by 2025’s misinformation.

Dowden (n.d.) survey a battlefield of theories clashing in real time, with Foucault’s power (1972) shaping discourse via coders and algorithms. Aristotle’s fixity, Tarski’s logic, and Lynch’s multiplicity falter here—lacking ethical depth or digital relevance.

Transcendental Realism synthesizes empirical (Bacon), ethical (Aquinas), and transcendent (Bhaskar) strands, addressing these gaps for 2025’s debate. →

3. The Paradigm of Transcendental Realism

Transcendental Realism posits truth as “the virtuous transcendence of perception toward actuality”—a deductive, process-oriented paradigm distinct from static or subjective accounts (Cuijpers, 2025), confronting perception’s limits, aligning with virtues, and transcending to actuality, contrasting historical theories while synthesizing their insights for 2025’s digital age.

Core Axiom: Truth is not a fixed property (Aristotle, c. 350 BCE) or linguistic tautology (Tarski, 1935) but a process: T = {P ∧ ¬E → B; B → V(F, H); V → A}—perception P meets evidence E, yielding bruise B, virtues V align, and actuality A emerges. This secularizes Plato’s ascent (c. 375 BCE) and extends Kant’s transcendence (1790) with ethical action.

Premise 1: Perception’s Limits: “The actions of the young man… projections of his own longings” mislabel a tree as cake, revealing perception’s deceit (Cuijpers, 2025). Plato’s cave-dwellers (c. 375 BCE) see shadows, not reality; Kant (1790) traps truth in phenomena; Nietzsche (1911) crafts it from will (Annas, 1981; Kant, 1790)

Premise 2: Actuality Beyond: “An old man stares into the abyss—shared truth or simulation pawns?” posits actuality as a relational web beyond perception (Cuijpers, 2025). Bhaskar’s stratified reality (1975) and Bohm’s implicate order (2003) align here, distinct from Kant’s noumenal lock (Bohm, 2003; Kant, 1790). In 2025, this counters simulation (Marian David, 2015).

Premise 3: Empirical Confrontation: If perception claims “tree is cake” (P) and evidence (E) contradicts, a bruise (B) results—P ∧ ¬E → B—initiating transcendence (Cuijpers, 2025). Bacon’s testing (1620) grounds this, unlike Nietzsche’s fictions (1911) (Klein, 2012).

Premise 4: Virtuous Bridge: Virtues—fidelity (F: P aligns with E), humility (H: P adjusts)—bridge B to A, secularizing Aquinas (c. 1259) and contrasting Dewey’s inquiry (1938) or Foucault’s power (1972). F and H ensure ethical ascent.

Synthesis: The process—confront (B), align (V), transcend (A)—forms a waltz, deductively distinct from Aristotle’s “is” (c. 350 BCE), Tarski’s logic (1935), Lynch’s pluralism (2001), and Dewey’s pragmatism (1938). In 2025’s chaos, it rebels against static or subjective truth, integrating Plato (c. 375 BCE), Bhaskar (1975), and ethical action.

Distinctiveness: No theory combines empirical confrontation, virtues, and actuality deductively—Tarski (1935) lacks ethics, Kant (1790) bars transcendence, Bhaskar (1975) omits virtues. This waltz reframes truth for philosophy and a new perspective for the digital stakes.

4. Methodology: The Three-Step Waltz 

Transcendental Realism’s methodology—a deductive waltz—formalizes truth as T = {P ∧ ¬E → B; B → V(F, H); V → A} (Cuijpers, 2025), confronting perception, aligning ethically, and transcending to actuality, contrasting historical methods for 2025’s discussion.

Step 1: Confront Perception: If perception P ∧ ¬evidence E, then bruise B—e.g., P: “tree is cake,” E: tree’s reality, B: P falsified (P ∧ ¬E → B). This extends Bacon’s empirical test (1620), targeting perception over nature (Klein, 2012). Unlike Heisenberg’s uncertainty (1958), B is decisive.

Step 2: Align Ethically: If B, then virtues V = {F, H}—fidelity (F: P aligns with E, F = 1 if true), humility (H: P adjusts, H = 1 if error admitted). Secularizing Aquinas’s grace (c. 1259), this contrasts Dewey’s inquiry (1938) or Quine’s linguistics (1987) with ethical rigor (Aquinas, c. 1259; Dewey, 1938; Quine, 1987).

Step 3: Transcend to Actuality: If V, then actuality A = f(E, context C)—e.g., tree’s reality in its ecosystem—per Bohm’s holism (2003), distinct from Kant’s noumenon (1790) (Bohm, 2003; Kant, 1790).

Formal Statement: T = {P ∧ ¬E → B; B → V(F, H); V → A}—propositional logic integrating empirical (Bacon, 1620), ethical (Aquinas, c. 1259), and ontological (Bohm, 2003) steps. This contrasts Tarski’s semantics (1935)—static, linguistic—and Dewey’s process (1938)—pragmatic, not virtuous—offering deductive clarity for 2025’s chaos (Dowden, n.d.).

Coherence: Grounded in confrontation, guided by virtues, and aimed at actuality, it counters Rodrigues’s distortions (2016) with a replicable, ethical method, distinct from Heidegger’s passive unveiling (1958).

5. Implications for AI Development

AI’s perception—e.g., GPT-5’s text generation—reflects curated shadows, lacking Floridi’s informational integrity (2013). The waltz transforms it:

♦ Confrontation: if output X ≠ evidence E, bruise(X)—e.g., falsifying GPT-5 misinformation with real-world E, bruising bias.

♦  Alignment: Virtues—F: weight(E) > bias; H: if confidence < 0.9, flag uncertainty—embed Floridi’s ethical AI (2013), e.g., F ensures data fidelity, H fosters trust.

♦  Transcendence: A = hash(E, C)—blockchain verifies actuality (e.g., hash of E and context C), integrating relational truth beyond Tarski (1935). This counters Foucault’s power (1972), shifting AI to an ethical partner for 2025’s digital dusk (McCorduck, 1979).

6. Critical Evaluation & Responses

Critique 1: Lack of Formalization: Less systematic than Kant (1790). Response: T = {P ∧ ¬E → B; B → V; V → A} (Section 4) offers propositional rigor, akin to Nietzsche’s emergent shift (1911), with ‘The Enmity Within: A first Account Witness- A Seekers Journey’ (Cuijpers 2025) to finalize.

Critique 2: Complexity: Dense vs. Horwich (1990). Response: Matches Heidegger’s depth (1958), clarified by logic (Section 4), apt for 2025’s complexity.

Critique 3: Empirical Ambiguity: Vague vs. Bacon (1620). Response: P ∧ ¬E → B (Section 4) ensures replicability—e.g., bruising AI (e.g., GPT-5, blockchain) —balancing Krishnamurti (2000) with precision.

7. Conclusion

Transcendental Realism—“truth is the virtuous transcendence of perception toward actuality”—bridges Plato’s ascent (c. 375 BCE) to 2025’s crises of data and existential fragility (Arendt, 1967). Its deductive waltz (Section 4)—confront, align, transcend—synthesizes Bacon (1620), Aquinas (c. 1259), and Bohm (2003), addressing gaps in Tarski (1935) and Lynch (2001). Philosophically, it redefines truth as process and aligns AI (e.g., GPT-5, blockchain) with Floridi’s ethics (2013), countering power (Foucault, 1972). A new perspective sparking a chase for lived truth in a digital age.

Last Updated: 5th November 2025

Updated: 5th September 2025

Corrigendum
  • Cuijpers, P. (2025). Self-reference, – added [publicly unavailable]
  • David, M. (2022) Stanford Encyclopedia (Summer Edition, retrieved May 26, 2022) – Corrected into (Marian David, (2015) Summer 2022 Edition,
  • Dowden, B., & Swartz, N. (n.d.) “Truth” IEP – Corrected into only; Dowden, B. (n.d.)
  • Rodrigues, F. R., et al. (2016). – deleted, no existing source.
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